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I. INTRODUCTION
Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, yet corporations whose trademark
rights are infringed by the production and sale of counterfeit goods would likely
disagree.' This sentiment is fueled by the fact that trademark infringement is
not accidental. Counterfeit goods are generally produced with the specific
purpose of infringing upon a company's trademark, as the product is intended
to pass as that of the trademark holder.2
Years ago, the sale of counterfeit goods could be traced to pop-up vendors
in localized markets, often infamous for selling cheap knock-off products.
Places such as Canal Street in New York City, where vendors sell designer label
products of dubious quality and origin, epitomized this localization and
reflected the practical limitations a physical market imposed on counterfeiting.
Today, an internet search for "replica louis vuitton" reveals the prevalence
and availability of counterfeit goods. The millions of search results illustrate
how the internet and e-commerce have exacerbated the problems previously
posed by counterfeiting. 3 Now, counterfeit goods are everywhere due to
factors such as increased international supply chains, the downturned global
economy, the shift of manufacturing jobs to countries with poor intellectual
property protection, and the growth of the online marketplace. 4
Trademark law has struggled to keep up with the ever-changing technology
of the internet-based marketplace. In the copyright context, the complexity of
potential infringement in an interconnected society has been addressed both
jurisprudentially and statutorily. 5 The law is somewhat less instructive for a
trademark owner concerned about online infringement. 6 This legal uncertainty
has been particularly troublesome for companies that find the web littered with
counterfeit goods sold from locations that are often difficult to trace.
The complexity of seeking out online sellers of counterfeit goods
complicates the process of a company bringing a direct infringement claim.
Companies have thus turned to secondary trademark liability, predicated on the
relationship between a third party and the alleged infringing activity, to protect
1 The Spread of Counterfeiing:

Knock-ofs Catch On, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.econo

mist.com/node/15610089?storyid=ElTVGTDDRJ.
2 SeeJulio 0. De Castro, David B. Balkin & Dean A. Shepherd, Can EntrepreneurialFirms Beneft
from Product Piracy?, 23 J. Bus. VENTURING 75, 78 n.3 (2008) (differentiating between counterfeit
and pirated goods based on consumer knowledge, a distinction not used in this Note).
3

The Spread of Cournterfeiting:Knock-ofs Catch On, supra note 1.

4Id

5 See

infra Part II.E.

6 Matthew Fornaro, A ParallelProbler: Gry Market Goods and the Internet, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y

69, 71 (2003).
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their marks from infringement. In the internet context, these claims have been
brought against parties who assist or facilitate an infringing website including
search engines, providers of payment services, hosts of online marketplaces,
and registrars of domain names.7
An emerging category of defendants in these lawsuits is the internet service
provider (ISP), a company that provides connectivity related services. One
such provider, the web host, typically provides IP addresses and bandwidth to
third parties, who in turn use the space to create websites. 8
In September 2011, the Ninth Circuit delivered a potentially devastating
blow to parties providing internet services, particularly web hosts.9 That court
upheld a jury award of ten and one-half million dollars against a provider of
web hosting services for contributory trademark infringement. 0 The plaintiff,
worldwide luxury goods producer Louis Vuitton, claimed that companies
hosting specific websites were contributorily liable for any infringing content
therein. Relying on an expansive interpretation of existing contributory
trademark infringement case law, the court seemingly agreed."
The Louis Vuitton decision reflects the difficulty of assessing liability on the
basis of internet content.12 On the one hand, if the creator of a website is not
accountable for its infringing content, then the party making it available should
bear the burden of liability. On the other hand, it seems intuitively unjust to ask
a provider of internet hosting services to make content-based determinations
that are potentially detrimental to their business at the behest of a single
corporation. The implications of such restrictions would certainly have chilling
effects on the freedoms of speech and information. 3
This Note argues that the Louis Vuitton decision impermissibly extended the
scope of contributory trademark liability. While the defendants in this case may
be less than sympathetic, the implications of the Louis Vuitton decision impose

7 See infra Part II.B.
8 See Complaint at 2, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 2007 WL
2732579 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (No. C 07 3952) (plaintiff Louis Vuitton brought suit alleging
contributory and vicarious trademark infringement against multiple defendants who "operate
servers hosting websites").
9 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2011).
10 Id (affirning the finding of liability for contributory trademark infringement, but modifying
the award, reducing it from $31.5 million to $10.5 million due to an error in jury instruction).

11Id

at 944-47.
12 See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Senice PrviderLiabiity for SubscriberCopyright Infringement, Enterpnse
LIabilly, and the FirstAmendment, 88 GEo. L.J. 1833, 1836 n.11 (2000) (citing scholarly discussions

of ISP liability for subscriber copyright infringement).
13 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing FirstAmendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REv. 381,

384-85 (2008) ("Protected expression is frequently suppressed or chilled by trademark law. . . .").
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an undue burden on web service providers. Further, the decision shifts the
trademark owner's burden to pursue infringers to tangentially related third
parties.
Part II of this Note examines the history of contributory trademark
jurisprudence and the extension of its application. Additionally, Part II
examines the Louis Vuitton case in closer detail. Part III of this Note explains
how the web host does not fit cleanly into the contributory trademark
jurisprudence and examines potential problems created by the Louis Vuitton
decision. Further, Part III proposes a legislative solution to the current state of
contributory trademark law. Part IV concludes that the Louis Vuitton case
potentially expanded liability for internet service providers. In addition, this
Note concludes that the murky state of the law should be addressed by
legislative resolution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. COUNTERFEITING OVER THE INTERNET

"The Internet has transformed many aspects of life, but perhaps none more
so than how we shop for goods and services."14 Even as the nation endures
rough economic times, retail e-commerce sales have continued to rise.15 The
expansion of the online market has provided consumers with greater choice in
6
products and convenient methods to compare and efficiently purchase them.'
However this market can simultaneously provide sellers relative anonymity,
allowing them to quickly unload items-an advantage when selling counterfeit
goods.17
14

NIELSEN Co., GLOBAL TRENDS IN ONLINE SHOPPING: A NIELSEN GLOBAL CONSUMER

REPORT 2 (June 2010), http://www.hk.nielsen.com/documents/Ql2010OnlineShoppingTrends
Report.pdf.
15 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS, Retail Trade 3 (May 26, 2011), http://www.census.gov/

econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf (noting that retail e-commerce sales reached $145 billion
in 2009, with an annual growth rate of 18.1% from 2002 to 2009).
16 See generaly Karen Alboukrek, Note, Adapting to a New World of E-Commerce: The Need for
Uniform Consumer Protection in the InternationalElectronic Marketplace, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.

425, 429 (2003) (noting that e-commerce results in a global choice in products for consumers);
Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism as a RationalBasis? The Impact on E-Commerce in the FuneralIndustry, 3

J.L. EcON. & POL'Y 189, 207 (2007) ("Online shopping allows consumers to conveniently
compare several sellers' prices. . ...
17 See generaly Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf is not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis of the
ConstitutionalRight ofAnonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527,

543-44 (2002) (arguing the interest of protecting consumers against fraud from anonymous
sellers should outweigh seller privacy rights).
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Counterfeit sales account for approximately 5% to 7% of the total global
trade.' 8 Global counterfeiting accounts for an estimated six hundred billion
dollars in revenue per year,' 9 with commercial losses by companies at an
estimated five hundred billion. 20 These quick and faceless sales challenge
companies to invent new ways to effectively monitor and enforce their
trademark rights.
B. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

A trademark "includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof' that is adopted or used by a manufacturer "to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown." 21 A company can register a trademark federally 22 So
long as it is "used in commerce," 23 requiring both proper trademark usage and
the sale or transport of the trademarked good in commerce. 24 Federal
trademark registration grants the owner a term of twenty years, which can be
renewed by showing continued use. 25
"Trademarks encourage competition, promote economic growth and can
raise the standard of living of an entire nation." 26 Policies underlying the
federal regulation of trademarks are aimed at the protection of both producers
and consumers of goods and services. 27 Trademarks aid consumers by allowing
them to associate a company's service or product with its corresponding quality
or reputation without confusion from similar marks.28 Producers are protected
from pirates and counterfeiters who would otherwise be able to free ride on the
time and money a company invests in the products represented by its

18Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., The Truth About Counterfeiting, http://www.iacc.org/abo
ut-counterfeiting/the-truth-about-counterfeiting.php.
19Brief for the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., Inc. as Arnicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 3, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-CV).
20 Id. at 3 n.3.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
22 Id. § 1115.
23 See id.§ 1127 (defining "used in commerce" as it applies to trademarks).
24 Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., A Primeron Trademarksand Sernice Marks, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 137, 142
(1986).
21

25 Id. at 141.
26

S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580.

27 See id
28 See H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1092.
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distinguished mark.29 Trademark laws therefore prevent consumer confusion
30
and unfair competition while promoting the goodwill of businesses.
The owner of a registered trademark can protect his rights under the
Lanham Act through civil action.3' One infringes a trademark under the
Lanham Act when, without consent, he uses another's trademark in commerce
in a way that will likely confuse consumers. 32 Once a trademark owner can
show that the alleged infringer used the mark in commerce, a court will use a
balancing test to evaluate the likelihood of consumer confusion.33
Liability for trademark infringement is not limited to those who directly
mislabel goods with another's trademark. 34 Courts have expanded the doctrinal
limits of trademark liability to include two theories of secondary liability,
vicarious and contributory liability. 35 Because the defendants in Louis Vuitton
were held liable based on a theory of contributory liability, this Note will focus
only on the theory of contributory liability.
C. CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

Contributory trademark infringement, a judicially created doctrine, has its
roots in the common law of torts. 36 The test for finding liability for
contributory trademark infringement was first articulated in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. where the holder of a pharmaceutical trademark
brought suit against a manufacturer of a generic drug.37 There, plaintiffs
brought suit against the manufacturer of a drug that looked almost identical to

S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580.
30 See Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Audtion Sitesfrm the Contributoy Trademark Liab&ky Storm:
A Legisladve Soluion to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 909, 917-19
(2005).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006).
29

32

Id

See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cit. 1979); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461-62 (7th Cit. 2000) (applying seven factor likelihood
of confusion test).
34 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) ("[L]iability for
trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of
another.").
35 See Katja Weckstrom, Liabiliofor Trademark Infringementfor Internet Senice Providers, 16 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 35 (2012) (noting "[tihat there is no federal legislation imposing liability
for contributory or vicarious trademark infringement," yet the Supreme Court recognized these
causes of action).
36 Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cit. 2010).
37 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 849.
33
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their own product.38 The suit was brought after pharmacies, relying on the
similar appearance of the two products, supplied patients with the generic
lookalike in place of the trademarked drug.39 The Supreme Court articulated a
two-prong test for contributory trademark liability holding that a defendant
could be found liable where he either intentionally induced another party to
infringe on another's trademark rights or continued to supply his product to a
party whom he knew or should have known was infringing another's trademark
rights. 40 The Court made it clear that parties would not be shielded from
liability if they knowingly distributed an infringing product. Instead, the Court
held that liability for infringing goods continues down the chain of distribution
of the goods.41 In this sense, one can imagine liability passing to each party
down the physical supply chain of the good from the manufacturer to the
consumer. This chain becomes distorted, however, when the parties involved
are online entities who may never physically come in contact with the infringing
goods.
Until recently, claims of contributory trademark infringement were most
commonly used in this manufacturer and distributor context. 42 The expansion
of this doctrine outside of the confines of the manufacturer and distributor
model has largely been predicated on the second prong of the Inwood test.43
This is likely because the first prong demands a higher burden of proof from
the plaintiff, requiring proof of intent. Internet access and worldwide markets
have given courts the opportunity to extend the Inwood test to third party
infringers whose relationships to the direct infringers are more attenuated than
the manufacturer to a distributor. The first such expansion of the Inwood test
was the application of the test to cases involving common law landlord-tenant

38 Id at 847.
39 Id. at 844, 854.
40 Id. at 854.
41 Id.
42 Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution
of Secondary Liabiity in Trademark and Copynght law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1389 (2006)
("[C]ontributory trademark liability has broadened in recent years to cover more than just
manufacturers and distributors."). Compare United States v. Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d 1238, 1246
(8th Cir. 1987) (discussing liability in the context of a manufacturer and distributor), with Tiffany
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding a website proprietor not liable for
contributory trademark infringement as a distributor of goods that infringed plaintiff jewelry
manufacturer's mark).
43 See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854 (differentiating between the international inducement and
knowledge and control prongs). The prevalence of the second prong in case law is likely due to
the plaintiff's lower burden of proof; it is likely easier to show knowledge of infringement than it
is to show intent to infringe.
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relationships as applicable to owners of swap meets or flea markets.44 The
second expansion of the test was in its application to third parties who provide
services rather than products to direct infringers. 45
1. The Landlord-Tenant Extension. The first major expansion of the Inwood
test was its application to the landlord-tenant relationship. In Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Cop. v. Concession Sernices, Inc.,46 the Seventh Circuit applied the Inwood
test to the owner of a swap meet (also referred to as a flea market). Vendors at
the defendant's market sold t-shirts that allegedly infringed on the registered
trademarks of the Hard Rock Cafe. There, the court "treated trademark
infringement as a species of tort" and compared the owner to a landlord, relying
on the Restatement of Torts in treating the trademark violation as a common
law tort.47
The Hard Rock court drew heavily from the concepts of landlord-tenant
relationships and premises liability in deciding that the Inwood test would apply
to the flea market owner. The Hard Rock court determined that the owner of
the flea market was responsible for the torts of those permitted on its premises
so long as he had actual or constructive knowledge of the trademark
violations. 48 Because of that defendant's limited supervision, there was no
evidence to show knowledge of the allegedly infringing activity. However, the
court noted that the defendant was more than a mere landlord because he
advertised the flea market, sold tickets for admission, and supervised the market
during hours of operation. 49 The court reasoned that the owner of a flea
market is more akin to a manufacturer who intentionally mislabels a good rather
than a "temporary help service" provider who helps or supplies the purveyor of
the counterfeit goods.50
The Hard Rock case not only extended the application of the Inwood test; it
also increased the scrutiny with which a court would evaluate a defendant's
knowledge. The court noted that the defendant in the case may have been
willfully blind where he knew that the product had "cut labels," were being sold
cheaply, and where he "did not ask vendors whether their goods were

44 See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49
(7th Cit. 1992); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996).
45 See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th Cir.
1999).
4 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cit. 1992).
47 Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148-49 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 877(c) &
cmt. D (1979)).
48 Id. at 1149.
49 Id. at 1148-49.
50 Id.
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counterfeit because they were sure to lie to him."5 1 The court noted that willful
blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of evaluating
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; however, failure to take actions
to prevent infringement was not an adequate measure of willful blindness. 52
Instead, the court looked to the party's suspicion of infringing activity and
failure to investigate.53
The Seventh Circuit treatment of the flea market owner with regard to
willful blindness is relevant to its explicit definition of the term: "To be willfully
blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate." 54
In the context of contributory trademark infringement, knowledge and
facilitation required by the Inwood test are thus satisfied with suspicion and
deliberate inaction. The court emphasized that while proof of willful blindness
would satisfy the requisite knowledge for a contributory claim, landlords would
not be expected to patrol and prevent the sale of counterfeit goods on their
premises.55 As a result, though the court extended the scope of potential
liability under the Inwood test, it expressly rejected a third party affirmative duty
to seek out or prevent the trademark infringement of others. The Seventh
Circuit's application of the Inwood test to landlord-tenant relationships has been
followed by other courts.56 The Ninth Circuit has similarly applied the
common law landlord analogy to an owner of a flea market.57
2. Extension to Senices. The second expansion of the Inwood test with regard
to contributory trademark infringement was its application to defendants who
provide services rather than physical items or space. While the Hard Rock case
touched on the subject, the issue was first truly addressed in Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., where an aircraft manufacturer brought an action
against the registrar of Internet domain names.58 The defendant was the sole
registrar of domain-name combinations but did not provide any web hosting

52

Id.
Id

53

Id

s1

Id.; see also Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (adoptng the Hard Rock
court's application of willful blindness as sufficient to charge knowledge under the Inwood test).
ss HardRock, 955 U.S. at 1149.
56 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D. Utah 2001); Coach, Inc.
v. Gata Corp., No. ID-CV-141-LM, 2011 WL 2358671 (D.N.H. June 9,2011).
57 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cit. 1996) (adopting the
HardRock analysis in applying the Inwood test to a flea market owner).
58 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
54
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functions.59 The plaintiff brought suit when third parties registered domain
names that the plaintiff believed to be infringing on its trademark rights.60
In denying the defendant's liability, the Ninth Circuit compared the services
of the defendant, a domain name registrar and router, to that of the United
States Postal Service. 61 The court noted that once a domain name was
registered, the defendant merely routed information to the Internet Protocol
(IP) address just as the Postal Service routes mail. 62 The court then noted that
while the registrant of the domain name pays a fee to the defendant for its
services, the defendant "does not supply the domain-name combination any
more than the Postal Service supplies a street address . . . ."63
The Lockbeed court found the application of the Inwood test to flea market
owners as landlord-like figures in Hard Rock and Fonovisa instructive for
application of the test in cases where there is no physical product being
supplied by the third party.64 The Lockheed court used a similar analysis in
finding the Inwood test applicable to service providers. 65 While pronouncing this
extension valid, the court declined to hold that defendant liable, finding it
lacked the "direct control and monitoring required to justify an extension of the
'supplies a product' requirement."66
The Lockbeed court placed new emphasis on the direct control and
monitoring element of a contributory infringement claim. 67 Other circuits have
incorporated this emphasis into their tests for contributory trademark
infringement in cases that involve services rather than goods, focusing on the
level of control a defendant has over the infringing activity. 68 In considering

5 Id. at 982.
60 Id. at 983.
61 Id. at 984-85.
62 Id.
63 Id
64 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cit. 1999)
("Hard Rock and Fonovisa teach us that when measuring and weighing a fact pattern in the
contributory infringement context without the convenient 'product' mold dealt with in Inwood
Lb., we consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party's means of
infringement.").
65 Id. at 984.
66 Id. at 985.

67 Cf Jason Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standardfor Contributoy Trademark Liabihty Over the
Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 375, 387 (2006) (arguing that the direct control and
monitoring element articulated by the Lockheed court was based on reliance on misstatements of
the holdings of Hard Rock and Fonotisa).
68 See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Optimum Techs., Inc. v.
Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007); Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121 (10th Cit. 2003).
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the defendant's level of control, the Lockheed court reasoned that while the
landlord of a flea market could be reasonably expected to supervise the
products sold on his premises, the domain name registrar could not have been
reasonably expected to monitor the Internet.69 It should be noted that this is the same
circuit that decided the Louis Vuitton case twelve years later.
The Lockheed decision thus expanded contributory liability beyond the
manufacturers and suppliers scope of the Inwood days. The application of the
Inwood test in Lockheed opened the door to secondary liability for actors who
were only indirectly involved in the sale of infringing goods.
D. THE GROWING USE OF CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY FOR INTERNET-BASED
CASES

Due to the difficulty of tracking potential infringers through internet
addresses or data, 70 companies have begun to look to secondary liability to
enforce their trademark rights. By proving knowledge and direct monitoring or
control by a third party, these trademark owners shift the focus from the direct
infringer to the service providers that may have aided the infringer.
Courts similarly have started to shift the analysis of contributory trademark
infringement from the manufacture and supply of infringing items to the
In evaluating contributory
mechanisms that facilitate the infringement.71
liability, an increasing emphasis is placed on either the relationship between the
direct infringer and the third party defendant or the relationship between the
infringement itself and the third party defendant. 72 After Lockheed, the inquiry
for secondary liability as applied to service providers focuses on the degree of
control and monitoring that the third party has over the infringing activity.73
69Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added) (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,
962 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
7o See, e.g.,Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing the difficulty of obtaining information about an infringing user).

71See, e.g.,Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2007)
(evaluating the relationship between an infringing party and payment systems); Gov't Emps. Ins.
Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (evaluating the relationship between a
search engine and infringing third party advertisers).
72See Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 675,
691 (2011) (arguing that by shifting the focus away from the supply of infringing items, the courts
have replaced a brightline rule with a hazy standard).
73 See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctnne: The Divergent
Evolution of SecondaU IUabi&y in Trademark and Copnght Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1391
(2006) (noting that the Lockheed standard has been widely adopted by other courts to the extent
that a lack of control and monitoring of the means of infringement may preclude contributory
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Cybersquattng and the Domain Name Trademarks. In order to fully

understand the severe implications of the Louis Vuitton case, it is important to
understand another source of recent contributory trademark infringement
litigation-cybersquatting domain name cases. While the Lockheed case was a
domain name case, it predated the competitive market for domain name registry
and sale. 74 After the introduction of a viable market for domain name registry,
there was a race to register popular names in hopes that the owner could sell
the name to an interested party.75 This led to a battle between companies who
had yet to register their trademarked name for an internet domain name and the
individuals who capitalized on this failure by registering domains that included
the names of companies protected by trademark law.76
In 1999, Congress responded to this growing problem by enacting the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).7 The statute imposes
liability on anyone who registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is
dilutive of or confusingly similar to a registered trademark with a bad faith
intent to profit from the use.78 Thus, to bring a claim for trademark
infringement by cybersquatting a plaintiff needs to prove three elements: (1) the
defendant registered, trafficked in, or used a domain name; (2) the domain
name was confusingly similar or dilutive of a distinctive or famous trademark;
and (3) the defendant had bad faith intent to profit from the mark.79
In 2001, three of the country's biggest automobile makers sued a domain
name auction site for infringement of their trademarked names.80 The
defendant company operated an auction website that appraised domain names
and provided a marketplace for buyers and sellers of domain names.8 ' The sites
at issue in the case included names such as "lincolntrucks.com" and
"jaguarcenter.com." 82

liability).
74 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that at the time the case was initiated, Network Solutions, Inc. was the exclusive
registrar for internet domain names; but during the course of the case, a competitive scheme was
introduced).
75 See Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Unform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Poiq, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 289, 295-96 (2000) (discussing the rise of domain name disputes).
76 Id.

77 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
78

Id.

79 Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
8 See id. at 640.
81 Id. at 639-40.
82Id. at 641.
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In their argument for contributory liability, the automobile companies
argued for the landlord application of the Inwood test, arguing that the defendant
website provided the "necessary marketplace" for the alleged cybersquatting.83
The court denied this application of the rule noting that the ACPA specifically
required a bad faith intent for liability.84 The court reasoned that Congress
intentionally made the threshold for proving infringement through
cybersquatting higher than that for a traditional infringement case.85 In so
holding, the court noted that liability for contributory trademark infringement
would apply only in exceptional circumstances. 86 This heightened burden of
proof may reflect an implicit understanding of both the difficulties of showing
willful infringement by an ISP and the slippery slope it might create.
2. The Online Marketplace and Contibutory Trademark Infringement. Recent cases
alleging contributory trademark infringement involve the use of online
marketplaces for the sale of goods.87 The most recognizable example of such
an online marketplace is eBay, an "eponymous online marketplace [that] has
revolutionized the online sale of goods."88 eBay and similar companies facilitate
the buying and selling of goods by hundreds of millions of people.89 Customers
are able to find goods that they might not otherwise find from the comfort of
their homes; and eBay profits from charging its sellers for use of its listing
services. 90 Unfortunately, eBay has also become a way for users to quickly and
anonymously engage in fraudulent activities by marketing and selling counterfeit
goods.9'
In Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., the Second Circuit addressed whether eBay could
be held liable for contributory trademark infringement where its sellers sold
items that violated the trademark rights of third party manufacturers. 92 Tiffany,
an international jewelry company, estimated that of all of the Tiffany products
sold over eBay, 75% were counterfeit.93 Tiffany sent Notices of Infringement
(NOIs) to eBay asking that the infringing content be removed. 94 eBay in turn,

83 Id. at 646.

84 Id. at 647.
8 Id,
8 Id

87 See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
88 Id. at 96.
89 Id.
9o Id. at 97.

91 See id. at 96 (noting that eBay gave counterfeiters the opportunity to "perpetrate fraud by
selling counterfeit goods").
92 Id. at 93.
93 Id. at 97.
94 Id. at 106.
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gradually improved its technology and promised to implement anti-fraud
measures as soon "as such measures became technologically feasible and
reasonably available."95 Dissatisfied, Tiffany filed suit against eBay, arguing that
the receipt of the NOIs established the requisite knowledge of infringement to
establish contributory liability through application of the Inwood test. 96
The Second Circuit's analysis of the Inwood test in the Tiffany case elaborated
on the level of knowledge required to impose liability for contributory
infringement. The court held that for a service provider to be held liable, it
must have "more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is
being used to sell counterfeit goods."97 The court reasoned that the Inwood
court refused to apply a more generalized, broad test of "knows or has reason
to know" to the facts before it.98 The court then reaffirmed what was suggested
in Hard Rock by noting that a service provider will not be shielded from liability
if it is willfully blind to the alleged infringement.99
The eBay decision added uncertainty to the realm of contributory trademark
infringement. EBay was not held liable primarily due to its lack of specific
knowledge of individual infringements, but also because the court found that its
prevention programs adequately protected others from potentially infringing
uses of protected marks. 00 Whether one of these factors on its own would
suffice to preclude liability remains to be seen. eBay's use of a prevention
program may only be relevant in the context of an online auction site, where the
service provider is an active participant in the sale, profiting from each
transaction. Courts may find protection programs less significant for service
providers who do not directly profit from the sale of allegedly infringing goods.
E. THE COPYRIGHT COROLLARY

The scope of copyright law varies from that of trademark law, in part
because of the different justifications for each area of law.' 0' Copyright law has
its roots in the Constitution and exists to encourage invention and creativity by
protecting the rights of inventors and creators.102 Trademark law addresses
9
96

Id. at 100.
Id. at 106.

9 Id. at 107.
9 Id. at 107-08.

9 Id. at 110.
100 Id. at 109.
101 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6.3

(4th ed. 2011) (discussing the distinct policies of patents, trademarks and copyrights).
102 See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the authority to "secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
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policy concerns rooted in business regulation, such as unfair competition and

consumer protection. 0 3 Secondary liability in the copyright context has its
roots in both common law tort doctrines and in the 1976 Copyright Act, which
twice references indirect liability standards.1 04
Contributory copyright law is broader in nature than its corollary in
trademark. 05 To be liable for contributory copyright infringement, one must
have knowledge of the infringing activity and induce, cause, or materially
contribute to the infringing conduct of another party.10 6 Copyrights prohibit
the unauthorized display of any copyrighted work or performance. 0 7 A person
can be liable for contributory copyright infringement if he has the ability or
right to supervise the infringing activity, or if he benefits financially from the
display of the copyright work, regardless of his knowledge of the infringing
activity. 08
The internet, as an outlet capable of quickly and frequently replaying or
displaying copyright works, created a new market for potential copyright
infringers. Several cases in the late 1990s raised the question of potential
liability for secondary copyright infringement for ISPs.o19
In response,
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright .Act (DMCA) in 1998.110
The statute creates safe-harbor provisions that insulate qualifying ISPs from
secondary liability for copyright infringement so long as they adopt a policy
reasonably aimed at stopping repeat infringers."' The statute essentially creates
a statutory notification and takedown system that balances the right of the

Discoveries").
103 See supra Part II.B.
104 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61, 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674,
5774-75.
105 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) ("Given the
fundamental differences between copyright law and trademark law, in this copyright case we do
not look to the standard for contributory infringement set forth in Inwood [.. .], which was crafted
for application in trademark cases." (internal citation omitted)); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l
Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The tests for secondary trademark infringement
are even more difficult to satisfy than those required to find secondary copyright infringement.").
106 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cit. 1971).
107 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-106.
108 Herbert J. Hammond, Intellectual Pmperty Issues in E-Commerce, UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL
ASPECTS OF E-COMMERCE, 2011 WL 4450808, at 5 (2011).

109 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm'ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Marobie-FL, Inc.
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997). See also S. REP. No.
105-190, at 17 (1998).
110 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
111See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998); 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
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copyright holder with that of the website owner.11 2 Each is held to a standard
of good faith in asserting that website content does or does not violate the
statute." 3 Utilizing the DMCA, a copyright holder's claim results in a judicial
determination as to the rights of the respective parties concerning their use of
the protected copyright.114
The notification system requires the copyright holder to notify an ISP of
potentially infringing material found on a website hosted by the ISP.115 The
copyright holder must identify the copyrighted work, the allegedly infringing
material, and where it can be located on the website." 6 Further, the holder
must assert a good faith belief that the material is infringing." 7 Finally, the
holder must certify that everything included in the notification is true and
accurate, subject to penalty of perjury." 8
Under the DMCA, the ISP is not required to make any judgments or
determinations about the validity of the copyright holder's claim."19 So long as
the holder makes a good faith allegation of infringement, the statute requires
the ISP to take reasonable steps to remove the material.120 This insulates the
ISP from liability without requiring it to evaluate the merits of a contributory
copyright infringement claim.121 The alleged infringer can submit a "counternotification" to the ISP asserting a good faith belief that the material removed
was done so by mistake or misidentification.122 The ISP then, in turn notifies
the original claimant that the material will be replaced or reinstated unless it
receives notice of a pending legal action within fourteen days. 23 In effect, a
copyright claim brought in this manner is analogous to a preliminary injunction.
The DMCA addresses the requisite knowledge for secondary liability by
separating ISPs who have actual knowledge of infringement and those who are
"aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."1 24
The history of the statute indicates that the "awareness of facts or

112

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2006).

113 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); see also Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003
(9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the good faith requirement).
114See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 8 (1998).
11517 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
116 Id.

Is Id. § 512(c)(3)(v).
Id § 512(c)(3)(vi).
119Id. § 512(c)(1).
118

Id.
Id.
1- Id. S 512(g)(3).
123 Id. § 512(g)(2)(B)-(C).
124Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(2).
120
121
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circumstances" was meant to describe "red flags" that would lead an ISP to
believe infringing activity was occurring on its site.125 Much like the description
of the knowledge requirement by the Hard Rock court, the DMCA does not
impose an affirmative duty on the ISP or web host to actively seek out or
punish potential infringers.126 Rather, it implements a formal notice procedure
that allows protection for copyright holders and essentially directs the
resolution of the underlying dispute to the courts.
F. THE LOUIS VUITTON CASE

Louis Vuitton produces and distributes high-quality luxury goods including
handbags, luggage, and accessories, all of which bear one or more of the
company's trademarks.127 The company actively polices the use of its
intellectual property to protect its products' exclusivity and its brand's
reputation.128 Louis Vuitton's complaints led to the seizure of nearly 9,500
29
knock-off items in 2009, an increase of 31% from the previous year.1 In
addition to these seizures, Louis Vuitton pursues its legal remedies by bringing
civil actions against individual infringers to protect its brand. Company-driven
lawsuits against manufacturers and distributors of counterfeit goods are at "an
all-time high."1 30
Through its protection programs, Louis Vuitton discovered websites
offering the sale of merchandise that infringed on many of its protected marks.
The counterfeit products were not actually sold on the website, but were
available through email contact with the seller.131 The websites were supported
by servers operated by Akanoc Solutions, Inc. (Akanoc), owned by Managed
Solutions Group, Inc. (MSG), and managed by Steven Chen.132 Louis Vuitton
sent numerous NOIs to the three parties involved, detailing instances of
copyright and trademark infringement on numerous websites hosted by the

125 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 53 (1998).
126 See Christlan C.M. Beams, The Copyight Dilemma Involing Onkne Service Providers: Problem
Solved... for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 834 (1999) ("[W]hile there was no affirmative duty to
constantly police one's customers, an [ISP], under the provisions of this bill, could not ignore
suspicious activity when it became aware of such activity.").
127 Complaint, supranote 8, at 3.
128 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2011).
129 The Spread of Counterfeiting: Knock-ofs Catch On, supra note 1.
130 Id.

131 Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 940.
132 Complaint,supra note 8, at 2.
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defendants.133 The notices demanded removal of the allegedly infringing
content.134
Akanoc, MSG, and Chen did not respond to Louis Vuitton's notices and
later denied receiving any notice from Louis Vuitton or its agents.1 35 With no
direct response from the defendant parties, and the infringing websites still up
and running, Louis Vuitton prepared for legal action against the infringers. The
company alleged that the individuals responsible for the content of the
infringing websites were based in China.'36 While the Lanham Act can be
applied to trademark infringers outside of the United States,' 37 plaintiffs
bringing a claim against a foreign infringer are held to a higher evidentiary
standard than those pursuing a claim against a domestic company.138 Rather
than filing suit against unknown infringers with unknown assets in a foreign
country, Louis Vuitton pursued its next viable target-the company that hosted
the allegedly infringing websites.
Louis Vuitton filed suit against Akanoc, MSG, and Chen alleging that the
defendants hosted websites that "offer[ed], promote[d,] advertise[d], and
facilitate[d] the offer and sale of counterfeit merchandise which infringe[d]" on
the trademark rights of Louis Vuitton.139 It appeared Louis Vuitton finally had
the web host's attention. The defendants responded to the complaint against
them by denying twenty-two allegations, claiming insufficient knowledge for
twenty-two allegations, and admitting only seven allegations (four of which
related to jurisdiction and venue).140 However, discovery later revealed
damning evidence that the defendants were well aware of the activity, including

133
134

Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 940.
Id.

135 Though, it appears that the companies did take minimal remedial action by emailing their
customers. See Defendants' Motion in Limine #5 to Exclude Emails Sent Between Defendants
and their Customers Discussing Subsequent Remedial Measures at 1, Louis Vuitton Malletier,
S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 2009 WL 1240903 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 507CV03952)
(showing that the defendants sent their customers takedown e-mails); Answer to Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 2007 WL
3161456 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007) (No. C 07-3952 JW) (denying receipt of notices).
136 Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 940.
137 See, e.g., Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding the
Lanham Act provides a "'broad jurisdictional grant'. . . to 'all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress' ") (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283, 286 (1952)).
138 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Post-Trial Motions; Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for a Permanent Injunction, at 8, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc
Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 5598337 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (No. C 07-03952JW).
139

Complaint,supra note 8, at 10.

See Answer to First Amended Complaint, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions,
Inc., 2008 WL 6859064 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2008) (No. C 07-3952 JW).
140
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an email to an infringing website owner writing, "Stupid LV, they sue us instead
of APE168."l41
The defendants in the Louis Vuitton case may not evince sympathy as passive
participants unknowingly held responsible for the infringing activity of others.
However, it was later revealed through discovery that they specifically targeted
42
foreign customers who were trying to expand business into the U.S. market.1
The defendants knew that there was potentially infringing activity on its sites
and their inaction was predicated on a "not-my-problem" mentality. The
troublesome nature of this evidence was exacerbated by the plaintiff's request
for a jury trial, rather than the more typical bench trial for trademark
infringement cases. These factors may very well explain the multi-million dollar
jury award in this particular case. Nonetheless, the decision marks an expansion
of existing contributory trademark law that may be problematic for web hosts.
The Louis Vuitton court extended liability to a third party for hosting an
allegedly infringing website.143 In doing so, the court relied on the landlordtenant relationship by emphasizing the physical space the infringing websites
occupied on the defendant's servers.144 The court further relied on its
interpretations of Inwood and the contributory trademark jurisprudence to affirm
the defendant's liability and adjust the damages award.145 The Lockheed "direct
control and monitoring" test was the final tool used by the court to reach its
decision.146
III. ANALYSIS
This Note proposes that the Louis Vuitton court impermissibly expanded the
scope of liability for contributory trademark infringement. The proposed
solutions include a model legislative solution that could have equal application
in the judicial realm.

141

Tresa Baldas, Add KnockoffHandbags to Web Hosts' Woes, FL. Bus. REV., Sept. 30, 2009.

Opposition of Plaintiff to Defendants Rule 50(a) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Regarding: Contributory Trademark Infringement Claim at 4, Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 5598337 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 07-03952 JW), 2009 WL
3462254 (noting that this evidence was revealed both through the defendant's webpage and
through testimony of Defendant Chen).
14 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011).
142

144

Id.

145 Id. at 942, 947.
146 Id. at 942.
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A. WHY WEB HOSTS ARE NOT COVERED BY PREVIOUS JURISPRUDENCE

The relationship between a web host and a website owner does not easily
comport with the established extensions of contributory trademark liability.
The defendants in the Louis Vuitton case provided a bundled service to their
customers, including IP addresses and bandwidth.147 This relationship may
share similarities with those cases previously finding contributory trademark
liability, but it is not directly on point with such jurisprudence.
1. The Landlord-Tenant Analogy. The application of the landlord-tenant
extension of contributory trademark jurisprudence to the role of web hosts is
superficially the most analogous. A web host, like the owner of a flea market,
leases space on its server to a customer "tenant" who can then use that space to
sell goods. The Louis Vuitton court relied on the physical space the website
occupied on the defendant's servers to extend the Inwood test under a theory of
premises liability.148 A look at the role of a web host, however, reveals that it
does not properly fit into the landlord-tenant extension.
Relevant to the application of premises liability to trademark law is the "use
in commerce" requirement for an enforceable trademark right. In the Hard
Rock opinion, the court specifically points to the ways in which one of the
defendants derived income from the ownership of the flea market that housed
the infringing activity.149 The court used this initially to demonstrate the
landlord's knowledge of the sale of goods. 50 Fundamentally, the analysis shifts
from any landlord-tenant relationship to those involving leased space to tenants
primarily engaged in the sale of goods. 151 This logically follows from the Inwood
test because facilitating an infringing activity would require the direct infringer
to use the trademark in commerce. The focus on the landlord-tenant
relationship in the Seventh Circuit's analysis is therefore predicated on the
leased space being used for the sale of goods.
In an attempt to couch the web host's liability in the landlord-tenant
extension, the Louis Vuitton court focused on the fact that a web host
"'physically host[s] websites on their servers.' "152 This analysis ignores the
Id. at 940.
Id. at 942 ("But websites are not ethereal; while they exist, virtually, in cyberspace, they
would not exist at all without physical roots in servers and internet services.").
149 See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th
Cir. 1992) (noting that the flea market owner profited in commerce by renting space to vendors,
charging reservation and storage fees to vendors, charging shoppers a nominal admission charge,
and operating concessions inside the actual market).
147

148

150 Id. at 1148-49.
151 Id
152

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 942-43 (quoting Louis
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practical difficulties that the analogy between web hosts and landlords creates.
While an internet server technically occupies a physical space, the sale of the
goods does not occur in that space in the way it would at a flea market. Rather
than the owner having the ability to walk around the market and simultaneously
observe the -sale of goods by various vendors, a glance at the physical server
that hosts an infringing website would likely only reveal wires and circuitry. In
this regard, the landlord analogy would only be appropriate if web hosts
regularly checked the content of the websites using their server space just as a
flea market owner walks around his market. Given the vast number of websites
that can be stored on a single server, this seems impractical and unlikely.
A second difficulty stemming from extending the landlord-tenant approach
to the Louis Vuitton case relates to the potential non-infringing uses of webhosting services. While a web host leases physical space on its servers, it does
not necessarily follow that the space will be used to operate a website that sells
goods. Websites can be used for purposes that are completely void of
commercial activity. This factually distinguishes cases involving web hosts from
those previously recognized under the landlord-tenant extension of the Inwood

test. Even on websites that do sell goods, the web host would not be required
to check the content under the landlord-tenant extension because, as the Hard

Rock court stressed, there is no affirmative duty to prevent counterfeiting. 53
Because a web host cannot physically observe the sale of potentially
infringing goods and should not be expected to police the content of the
websites it hosts, its role is not congruent with the landlord-tenant relationship.

The Louis Vuitton court thus applied the rationale from the Seventh Circuit Hard
Rock decision to a factually inapposite case.
The defendants in the-Louis Vuitton case arguably possessed the requisite
knowledge to satisfy the Seventh Circuit's willful blindness test. However, it
should be noted that Louis Vuitton's NOIs present a slightly different notice
than those in the Hard Rock case.'54 While an owner of a flea market can
develop suspicions of infringing activity through firsthand observations, the
Louis Vuitton court seems to equate notice from an interested third party with
the type of first party notice that the defendant in the Hard Rock case was
capable of achieving. Notice from a third party through NOIs is not
sufficiently like firsthand knowledge achieved through physically seeing
infringing t-shirts. The distinction may be irrelevant because all that is required

Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).
1s3 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.
1992).
154 Id.at 1151 & n.5.
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for willful blindness is a reason for suspicion; however, it may be reasonable for
a third party NOI to raise less suspicion when viewed in tandem with the third
party's motives.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit focused on the distinction between "the
manufacturer of a mislabeled good ... [and] a temporary help service supplying
the purveyor of goods." 55 The court reasoned that a temporary help service
might not be contributorily liable for an act like furnishing workers with the
materials to build a stand at which to sell counterfeit goods, even where the
provider knew of the intended infringing activity. 5 6 This temporal distinction
reflects the court's unwillingness to assign liability to parties who merely
provide supplies to a direct infringer. This may apply to web hosts who provide
services essential in the startup process of a website; however, given the
prolonged rental of the physical server space, it should not be the primary
distinction.
2. Lockheed and Cbersquatig. The Lockheed opinion suggests that its
analysis of contributory trademark infringement does not directly apply to web
hosts.157 Ignoring the routing services that the defendant provided, the court
emphasized the passive role that a domain name registrar plays in registering an
infringing name. Because the Lockheed court focused on the defendant's routing
service rather than its name registration, the court was able to use the
defendant's lack of direct monitoring and control to deny liability. 58
The Lockheed court agreed with the lower court, noting that "infringement
does not result from [the defendant]'s publication of the domain name list, but
from the registrant's use of the name on a web site ... in connection with
goods or services."159 The court further explained that a third party would not
be responsible for monitoring the internet for infringing uses.160 It declined to
analogize the knowledge expected of flea market owners, who could reasonably
be expected to monitor the merchandise sold, to internet translation services
noting, "[s]uch a stretch would reach well beyond the contemplation of Inwood
Lab. and its progeny."' 6 '

15s

Id.at 1148.

156

Id

157 See

Lockheed Martin, Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1999)

("NSI does not consult third parties during the registration process, check for a registrant's right
to use a particular word in a domain-name combination, or monitor the use of a
combination .... It performs none of the 'hosting' functions for a web site.").
158 Id
159 Id.at 985.
160 Id. at 984-85.
161 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's refusal to hold a domain name registrar liable in Lockheed
seems at odds with its decision in the Louis Vuitton case. If a party cannot be
expected to monitor the use of a website for which it registers the name and
routes internet traffic, it seems absurd to ask a web host to monitor the content
of every website for which it provides an IP address. Presumably, it would be
easier to monitor the names that the registering party routes and registers than
the content on the corresponding page. The Lockheed decision apparently relied
on the lack of physical real estate in declining to apply the Hard Rock test.162
This distinction may be the very reason that the Louis Vuitton court focused on
the "physical" space infringing sites occupied on the defendant's servers.' 63
Despite the ambiguities in the Lockheed court's rationale, Congress addressed
potential contributory trademark liability in the context of domain names when
it enacted the ACPA. This statute requires a bad faith intent when using an
infringing name, clearly limiting liability for domain name service providers.164
The reluctance of both Congress and the Ninth Circuit to previously hold
similar web service providers liable for contributory trademark infringement
makes the Louis Vuitton case inconsistent with this line of contributory
trademark infringement jurisprudence.
3. Tiffany and the Online Marketplace. The recent Tofany decision combines
the rationales behind the Hard Rock and Lockheed decisions. While eBay is an
internet service provider with features similar to the defendant in Lockheed (and
arguably a web host), it also provides a marketplace for the sale of goods,
similar to the market provided by the owner of a flea market. The Tiffany court
focused not only on the defendant's direct control and monitoring of the
website, but also on the financial gain the defendant received from the
potentially infringing uses of its website.s65 This virtual marketplace theory
seems to provide a justified extension of the Inwood test to the company's
activities.
Unlike the defendants in the Tiffany case, a web host does not provide a
virtual online marketplace, nor does it gain financial benefit specifically from
the sale of goods. While a web host does receive money for the services it
provides, these payments are not compensation for the sale of goods. This
poses a direct contrast to online marketplaces like eBay, which receive
commission fees based directly on the sale of individual goods.

Id. at 985.
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 2011).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
165 See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing how eBay generates
revenue by charging insertion fees and final value fees associated with its listings).
162
163
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B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THIS PRECEDENT

1. Improper Delegation of Authority. By holding the defendant contributorily
liable for the violations of a website for which it provided web hosting services,
the Louis Vuitton court essentially delegated its judicial authority to a third party.
Faced with an NOI from a company alleging an infringing website, a web host
This
must evaluate that website for potential trademark infringement.
determination should be left to the judicial system as it is in prior common law
and in the DMCA.
2. Inefficiency of the Evaluation Shift. The Louis Vuitton court shifted the
evaluation of an allegedly infringing website from the trademark owner, who is
in the best position to evaluate the merits of an infringement claim, to a less
knowledgeable party. A web host is likely to lack the requisite knowledge of
both the trademark and trademark law to evaluate allegedly infringing activity.
The Louis Vuitton decision essentially requires web hosts to take down
infringing content, to gain knowledge as to what is or is not infringing activity,
or to hire someone with the requisite knowledge to properly evaluate allegedly
infringing activity.
Imposing this burden on a web host is problematic. It allows the company
typically charged with protecting its trademark rights to shift not only the
burden, but also the cost of protecting its trademark rights to web hosts. This
cost will ultimately be borne by the creators of websites, many of whom seek to
use websites for non-infringing activities. This redistributes the cost of policing
trademark use to people who are not parties to nor profit from infringing uses
of websites.
3. Perverse Incentives. By redistributing the responsibility for enforcing
trademark rights, the Louis Vuitton decision also encourages companies to file
claims. Because a web host can be liable for inaction in the face of alleged
infringement, the Ninth Circuit decision encourages the speedy dismantling of
infringing websites. However, this gives trademark-owning companies the
perverse incentive to send frivolous NOls, or at least lowers the threshold for
their willingness to send NOIs. In the face of an NOI, without statutory or
judicial protection, a web host can protect itself by removing or suspending the
allegedly infringing website or content. Relying on this, trademark-owning
companies can now merely notify the web host or the owner of the physical
server and expect the content to come down.
Prior to taking content down, the web host must evaluate the merits of the
claim and make a judgment call as to its likely success. If a web host takes
down a website, the owner of the website can presumably sue for breach of
contract, leaving the trademark-owning company out of the picture entirely.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2012

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9

452

J.INTELL

PROP.L

[Vol. 19:427

This subverts the intention of the Lanham Act and its distribution of
responsibility.
4. Failure to Address Content. Finally, the Louis Vuitton decision affirmed
liability without regard for the website owner or the content of the site. The
proof in the case was based purely on the plaintiff's affidavits. Because the
direct infringer was located in China, and was not present at the trial, the court
accepted the plaintiffs characterizations as true. Further, the opinion seemingly
fails to adequately protect a website that makes use of trademarks under one of
the permissible exceptions under the Lanham Act. The decision is void of any
suggestion as to where the website owner whose site did not in fact infringe on
another's trademark should seek redress.
In the contributory copyright infringement corollary, the DMCA provides a
website owner a chance to respond to website removal with an affidavit
asserting a good faith belief in its non-infringing use. Further, the company
alleging infringement is required to file legal action in order for the website to
remain down.166 This ensures that the website owner will not have the content
of their site removed based purely on a frivolous claim.
The result of the Louis Vuitton decision may be that website owners will be
subject to the will of trademark-owning corporations due to their unhampered
ability to pressure web hosts into removing content. With no statutory scheme
and jurisprudence that is less than cohesive, the website owner may be subject
to takedowns and the web host subject to expansive contributory trademark
infringement liability.
C. PROPOSAL

The role of a web host is most analogous to that of a domain name registrar.
Under this analogy, it is unclear that the web host would be required to monitor
the content of websites it hosts, as courts have been reluctant to have hosts
"monitor the internet."1 67 In fact, web hosts are even further removed from
infringing activity than those registering domain names because the service they
provide, i.e., space on their server, does not itself infringe trademarks.
Because there is no other case law directly on point, there should be either
statutory guidelines or judicial instruction to guide courts and instruct web hosts
on ways to avoid potential liability. The DMCA provides this type of
instruction because it provides a notice and takedown structure for a similar
problem in the copyright infringement context. However, because the laws of

166 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2006).
167 Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 985.
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copyright and trademark have different underlying policies and goals, simply
transposing the DMCA guidelines into trademark law will not adequately
address the problem of contributory trademark infringement. Therefore, a
legislative solution to contributory trademark infringement should apply similar
regulations similar to the DMCA, yet be more narrowly tailored to address the
needs and policies of trademark law.
Legislation regulating contributory trademark infringement should have a
notice requirement similar to that of the DMCA. This requirement should
provide a limited duty to the web host to reveal the direct infringer's contact
information. Upon discovery of a potentially infringing use of a protected
trademark, the trademark-owning company should send notice to the web host
whose website supports the content. This would put the web host clearly on
notice that the website potentially violates trademark law.
Unlike the DMCA, however, the solution in trademark law should not
mandate an immediate takedown after the notice requirements are met because
different policies motivate the protections afforded by copyright and trademark
law. In copyright law, .an infringement occurs whenever the work of a
copyright owner is replicated or displayed. In the internet context, this explains
the necessity of an immediate takedown by a web host or ISP. The display of
the material itself is infringement; therefore, third parties should be able to stem
the infringement, subject to pending or future legal action. In the trademark
context, protection is needed for not just the owner of the right that is being
protected, but also the consumer. Additionally, the display of a protected
trademark is not in and of itself a violation of the owner's right. The permissive
fair uses under the Lanham Act could legitimately allow a trademark to be
displayed on a website, and thus deserve more protection from takedown than
68
the DMCA allows copyright owners.1
A model system would allow the website owner and alleged trademark
infringer to respond to the notice that is provided to its web host. If the
website owner claims a good faith, legitimate use of the trademark, the
trademark-owning company would then be required to seek a declaratory
judgment before takedown of the content is required. In the event that the
alleged infringer does not respond at all to notice, the model system would then
allow the web host to take the infringing content down. The notice and reply
system would ensure that a website will no longer be arbitrarily removed
without giving its owner a chance to defend the legitimate use of another's
trademark.

168 See

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
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Until the passage of such legislation, the courts should take efforts to limit
the liability of web hosts for contributory trademark infringement. Courts have
expressed a reluctance to force internet service providers to monitor the
content of multiple internet sites.169 Further, the Supreme Court noted that
contributory trademark infringement should be construed more narrowly than
its counterpart in copyright.170 Courts should use this cautious approach when
seeking to evaluate secondary trademark liability as it applies to web hosts.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Louis Vuitton Malleier, S.A. v. Akanoc
Solutions, Inc. opened the door to potentially vast contributory trademark liability
for web hosts. The standard for contributory trademark infringement set forth
in Inwood has been expanded and built upon by courts leading to a varied,
unclear standard. Mistakenly analogizing other cases from these courts to the
Louis Vuitton case, the Ninth Circuit has applied rules from factually dissimilar
cases,. thus increasing the potential liability for web hosts and increasing the
monitoring costs of individual websites. The burden of this decision will be
borne by the creators and users of websites themselves, as this added
monitoring will likely eventually be built into the cost of all website services
provided by actors like web hosts.
The Louis Vuitton decision also shifts responsibility for policing trademark
infringement from the owner of the right to the third party web host. This may
create perverse incentives for the trademark owners to erroneously report

169 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that

Congress created a tort immunity for Internet service providers in the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, because "[i]t would be impossible for service providers to screen
each of their millions of postings for possible problems"); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Comm'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[I]t does not make
sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the
infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system. that is necessary for the
functioning of the Internet.").
170 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984)
(analogizing patent law to copyright law, noting "[w]e have consistently rejected the proposition
that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law. . ."); see also Hard Rock
Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he

Supreme Court tells us that secondary liability for trademark infringement should, in any event,
be more narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringement."); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 965 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Because the property
right protected by trademark law is narrower than that protected by copyright law, liability for
contributory infringement of a trademark is narrower than liability for contributory infringement
of a copyright.'.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss2/9

28

Backus: Passing the Virtual Buck: How the Ninth Circuit Used Contributory

2012]1

PASSING THE VIRTUAL BUCK

455

infringing material, or at least expend less effort to investigate material that
actually infringes on their rights. The onus would be on the web host as a
monitoring third party to evaluate the material and remove it from the website
if necessary.
What is clear after the Ninth Circuit's decision is that web hosts will have to
pay more attention to potentially infringing material than the trademark owners
themselves. While the Louis Vuitton defendants took misleading actions to
avoid the notices the company provided, it is still unclear what actions a web
host should take in response to valid notices of infringement. What is clear
after Louis Vuitton is that the web host will obviously have to take some sort of
action after receiving notice, presumably taking the infringing content down.
Inaction is clearly no longer an option.
This Note proposed a legislative solution that is similar to the DMCA, yet
more restrictive in its scope. This would give web hosts clear guidelines to
handle a notice of potentially infringing content. However, while legislation
remains missing from our trademark law regime, the courts should provide
more protection to web hosts from contributory trademark infringement
liability.
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